Demography and government
by Philip Longman
After World War II, the GI bill dramatically lowered the cost of homeownership for millions of young Americans. Its educational benefitsalso allowed millions of men still in their twenties to start earningnearly as much as their fathers. The bill’s purpose was not to create ababy boom in the United States. But that is what it did-a good exampleof how government policies, even when not explicitly pro-natal, canmake the economics of parenthood less punishing and thereby enable morepeople to afford the children they want.
Today, in both Europe and the United States, women coming to the endof their reproductive years report that they did not have as manychildren as they would have liked. Such statements suggest an implicitdemand for children that is not being met. The reasons for this trendare complex, but many are clearly within the scope of government toameliorate.
One way to do this would be to give parents relief from punishingand unprecedented payroll taxes. Other ways would be to make access tohealth care less contingent on full-time work, to encourage greater agediversity in university admissions, and to provide more resources forchildcare. Within Europe today, the highest fertility rates are foundin the nations that do the most to ease the strains between work andfamily life.
Are fears of population decline overblown? The matter cannot besettled by pointing to history, because no previous society hasexperienced population aging on the scale and at the speed of that nowoccurring throughout the world. Demographic change once moved at atectonic pace. But countries such as China are now aging as much in onegeneration as countries such as France did over the course ofcenturies. And even in healthy, peaceful populations, fertility ratesare falling well below replacement levels and staying there-a trendthat, again, has no historical precedent.
How certain is the global aging trend? One can be quite sure howmany elders there will be over the course of the next 70 to 80 yearsbecause those people have already been born. And without some newtotalitarian or fundamentalist force commanding procreation, the globaldecline in fertility rates is unlikely to reverse itself.
As I stated in my article, lower fertility does seem to bring someeconomic benefits when it begins. And as I discuss in greater detail inmy book, The Empty Cradle, there are many ways in which societies canencourage more productivity and more productive aging. But a societythat consistently consumes more human capital than it producesobviously must prepare for new and difficult challenges.